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A Tradition at War with Itself: A Reply to
Professor Rana's Review of America's




Let me begin by thanking the Texas Law Review for commissioning a
review of America's Forgotten Constitutions and Professor Aziz Rana for his
close and generous reading of my book.1 Professor Rana delightfully
captures what I set out to accomplish in this volume, which is first to recover
a set of constitution-writing projects that usually elude the canon of
constitutional studies, and second, by virtue of their inclusion, to challenge
the dominant view of American constitutional law. Obviously, there are too
many such events to tackle in a single book, so difficult selection choices had
to be made. In the end, I settled upon eight relatively unknown constitutions
that reveal something about the broader political culture found in the United
States: some of the ideas, processes, and events that continue to shape legal
battles today. In that sense, while the book's order is chronological (in the
sense that I deal with each event in the order in which it occurred in historical
time), the book's main goal is to explore the alternative constitutional
theories developed by American citizens. In particular, I tried to focus the
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. I appreciate the
editorial assistance of the staff at the Texas Law Review.
1. Aziz Rana, The Afany American Constitutions, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 1163 (2015) (reviewing
ROBERT L. TSAI, AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONS: DEFIANT VISIONS OF POWER AND
COMMUNITY (2014)).
Response
reader's attention on the multiple forms of sovereignty that a constitution
might represent, as well as the different functions such a text might serve a
dissident community.
2
I am gratified that rather than being overwhelmed by the diversity of
legal ideas and experiences portrayed in the book, Professor Rana finds
himself exhilarated by the messiness that characterizes the views of these
citizen theorists. In his words, the constitutional theories of the average
citizens "are richly textured and internally complex."' These works of angst-
filled dreaming offer evidence of recurring grievances of neglected
subnational populations and clues as to possible weaknesses in our
constitutional system.
Rather than perpetuate the impression that mainstream constitutional
law is stable, as if citizens merely internalize the views of public officials
like automatons, my account questions whether the expectation of obedience
on the part of insiders is warranted by inverting the standard narrative. The
protagonists in my book enthusiastically adapt founding ideas and precedents
to the problems of the day. They are not always powerless,4 but many do
find themselves lacking political power. But whether these citizens may be
counted among the elite or not, their exasperation with the direction of
mainstream constitutional law (which I refer to in largely institutional terms
as the emergence of a theory of "conventional sovereignty")5 leads them to
conjure ancient origin stories and to invoke first principles to guide an act of
political self-creation.6 If their social standing does not always put them on
the periphery, their unorthodox ideological views certainly hold them up for
opprobrium and, more important, resistance from the powers that be.
Professor Rana's review beautifully grounds my work in the extant
scholarly literature. I allowed myself a broad smile when Professor Rana
invoked Richard Hofstadter's work as evidence of the Consensus School.
Though Professor Rana would have no reason to know this, I actually had
Hofstadter's scholarship in mind as I developed the book, both as a model
and a foil. I found worthy of emulation Hofstadter's unparalleled ability to
2. See ROBERT L. TSAI, AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONS: DEFIANT VISIONS OF
POWER AND COMMUNITY 5 17 (2014) (laying out the book's chronological organization and its
primary goals of inquiry into the multiple forms of popular sovereignty and functions of an
alternative constitution).
3. Rana, supra note 1, at 1175.
4. For instance, it would be difficult to deny the high social and political status enjoyed by
Confederate slaveholders who sought to preserve their cultural heritage or the academics who
dreamed of a single constitution that might save the world from nuclear destruction. See TSAI,
supra note 2, at 135 41, 188 95.
5. See id. at 9 10.
6. These twin founding principles are twofold: (1) the natural right to self-goverance, which
has never been divested to any particular government; and (2) the centrality of a written
constitution, which supersedes conflicting law, norms, and practices.
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locate broad themes across historical time and to convey his discoveries in
plain language.7 At the same time, his assertion that a consensus existed over
American values has always seemed too pat to ring true. I wanted to present
an account of the political tradition that would be at once more colorful,
inclusive, and rancorous than the one he envisioned.
II. More On Conventional Sovereignty
In his review, Professor Rana raises two points about the book's
approach to which I shall respond briefly. His first concern is that America's
Forgotten Constitutions might not go far enough in attacking the consensus
approach-that it might actually contain a "hidden" teleological
understanding of the development of constitutional law.8
I want to reject that criticism. Nowhere in the book do I claim that
American constitutional law, understood as an ideological and social
practice, evolved in a way that was inevitable or predictable. Nor has the
original ethical nature of the U.S. Constitution simply been revealed over
time. To steal from King, I do not think that the moral arc of constitutional
law "bends toward justice."9
I do find it important to acknowledge there can be a set of ideas that are
active rather than latent, enforced through institutions, and may be said to
dominate political and legal discourse at certain historical moments. To me,
this is simply accounting for the fact that ideas have consequences and that,
within the realm of public life, some legal ideas have had more influence
than others. A contest over foundational ideas is never a fair fight; it is
always about control, and some ideas will be in a position to dictate destinies,
while other, perhaps innovative, ideas must dislodge those prevailing ideas
for a legal vision to have sustained success.
Perhaps the confusion arises from my use of the term "conventional
sovereignty" to capture a narrow range of mainstream constitutionalism,1 a
concept that is more plastic than the other popular theories of power and
7. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955);
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION: AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT
(1948). Hofstadter would have rejected the label of "Consensus School" practitioner just as surely
as he avoided disciplinary jargon. And no doubt he would point to the complexities in his own
accounts. But the fault lines in the American belief systems are deeper than Hofstadter allows and,
at least in my view, frequently in different places than Hofstadter saw them. I do agree with Foner
that Hofstadter's work was not as unabashedly celebratory as other consensus-based works. See,
e.g., Eric Foner, Richard Hofstadter: Columbia's Evolutionary Historian, in LIVING LEGACIES AT
COLUMBIA 405, 407 08 (Wm. Theodore de Bary ed., 2006).
8. Rana, supra note 1, at 1171 72.
9. Martin Luther King Jr., Our God is Marching On! (Afar. 25, 1965), STANFORD: THE
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. RES, & EDUC. INST., https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/our-god-
marching [https://perma.cc/NCE8-YZMN].
10. See, e.g., TSAI, supra note 2, at 10 13.
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community discussed in the book. Because every constitutional theory arises
in response to some existing set of ideas and practices of power, I needed a
way to frame the prevailing weight of institutional interpretations,
preferences, and expectations of the U.S. Constitution at any given moment
in time. This is the body of official rulings, statutes, interpretations, and
expectations that appear to govern at any moment in time. I believe that
status quo views of the law have their own force, even if they are not
ideologically consistent. The status quo will always have its defenders,
sometimes out of substantive agreement with a governing regime but other
times simply for broader rule-of-law reasons, or even out of inertia. So in
using the phrase "conventional sovereignty" I wish to direct the reader to key
features of mainstream constitutionalism-accepted by many Americans but
certainly not all-that might be said to have potency in any particular era.
I always intended the concept to change over time, but I see more
clearly now that it is also different in kind from the other theories of power
and community discussed in the book: thinner, "prefer[ring] ... order,
integrity, and gradualism," " but not necessarily committed to any
substantive values as rich as those found in the legal theories developed by
pioneers, revivalists, preservationists, or internationalists. I think it is safe to
say that defenders of conventional sovereignty will not be revolutionaries (or
at least they will be retired revolutionaries), but instead are likely to favor a
strict reading of Article V of the Constitution, endorse stare decisis, and
otherwise adopt a Burkean outlook to legal change. Beyond that, it is hard to
pin them down either in terms of ideological commitments or even the forms
of constitutional argumentation that might be preferred. 12
Even so, it is possible for a conventional account of the Constitution to
contain features of other theories of popular sovereignty-which is why I
stressed that these models of constitutionalism are really exemplars rather
than hermetically sealed from one another.3 I certainly do not intend to
"keep mainstream constitutionalism isolated from and uncontaminated by
practices of illiberalism," as Professor Rana warns.14 When I discuss John
Brown's Constitution and the Confederate Constitution, I point out the
various ways that the Supreme Court or Congress endorsed slavery, along
with the particular theories of property and federalism that assisted in this
11. Id. at 11.
12. Here I have in mind the various ways in which Americans, whether lawyers or laypersons,
tend to speak of the Constitution: referring to the text, invoking history, contemplating its structure,
relying on precedents, resorting to broader values at stake, or cautioning decision makers about the
costs entailed in one interpretation or another. These forms of argumentation are not the same as
theories of popular sovereignty, though it may be the case that a particular theory of power and
community will draw on certain kinds of arguments but not others.
13. TSAI, supra note 2, at 9.
14. Rana, supra note 1, at 1174.
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nefarious work.'5 Similarly, in the chapter on the so-called Five Civilized
Tribes' efforts to establish the State of Sequoyah, I show how the growing
idea of liberal individualism is deemed crucial to twentieth-century ways of
securing freedom and autonomy in a rapidly industrializing society, but how
it is also seen as a threat to theories of tribal sovereignty.
16
More complicated still is the relationship of the Republic of New
Afrika's constitutional theory vis-ii-vis conventional sovereignty as its
members found it.17 In their devastating critique of the law, political freedom
of the sort promised by antidiscrimination laws and social integration is a
bitter illusion. It offers the appearance of fairness instead of actual
compensation for generations of violence and lost opportunities; more
importantly, it leaves in place political arrangements that continue to deny
the ability of black Americans to decide their own destinies. In each of these
episodes, as well as in others not mentioned here, there is a sense that
dominant approaches to liberalism as a broad value or equality as a specific
value are manifestly unjust.
Professor Rana points to my use of conventional sovereignty as
sometimes being "content-free" and sometimes appearing "interlinked with
liberal egalitarianism. "'s As I indicated before, I do not think that
conventional sovereignty is content free and never made such a claim. I do
plead guilty to the second charge as I wish to allow the conventional to
change in substance, which I believe it has over time. The actual content of
what the law "is" at any moment in time is not a seamless and coherent body
of work, but rather an eclectic accumulation of ideas, outcomes, and
precedents.
If by "liberal egalitarianism" Professor Rana means the claim that
equality of political and economic status is central to governance, I do
believe that a sketch of that idea existed at the founding in classical terms
adapted by transplanted Europeans to the perceived needs of a nation-state.
The founding project in 1787 took for granted the civic equality of white
landholding as a background fact, and extending the parameters of
citizenship simply was not on the agenda. As a dominant principle or
national reform project to embrace a heterogeneous polity, egalitarianism
took hold of the public imagination only in later generations as social groups
struggled for recognition and influence. 19
This is why I consider the Union's battlefield victory a defeat of a
cultural theory of power and community by the forces of conventional
15. See TSAI, supra note 2, at 83 151.
16. See id. at 152 84.
17. See id. at 218 53.
18. Rana, supra note 1, at 1172.
19. See TSAI, supra note 2, at 13 14.
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sovereignty, which had come to endorse egalitarianism as a reason for
fighting the war.2 0 Now, it is important to note that an ideological defeat is
rarely permanent; there are far too many entry and exit points in our system
of government for illiberal ideas to reemerge.
Liberal triumphalism is not only a bad look, it is also bad history.
Professor Rana's explication of the post-Civil War period as a resurgence of
cultural theories of law is well taken.2 ' My chapter on the Confederate
Constitution does not delve into Reconstruction, instead focusing on South
Carolina statesman Robert Barnwell Rhett's journey from agitator to
founder, back to a marginalized figure from the standpoint of conventional
law after the war.2 I end that chapter with Rhett's vocal efforts to keep alive
the ideas that founded a slaveholding republic.2 3 One war is over, but
another is just beginning. Rhett calls on Southerners to resist the
Reconstruction Amendments, to bear their "persecutions" as "blessings" until
the time is right to throw off their chains2 4 His words are not only a
shameless play on antislavery rhetoric, but they are also evocative of an older
conception of a constitution in social terms.
Aristotle wrote that a constitution is the "way of life of a people.2 5
Rhett seemingly appeals to this belief-and-practice based approach by
denying the claim of authority that the U.S. Constitution, as amended, makes
on him. That piece of paper will never be his constitution; instead, he
remains constituted as a citizen by the beliefs and practices of a slave-
holding society. Thus, he seeks to foster a continued sense of political
community based on defiant ideals. Southerners may have to swallow the
end of slavery, but they remain firmly in control of their territory and culture,
and they can retain a legal consciousness based on whiteness and a shared
struggle to maintain that heritage. The end of Reconstruction brings a
horrifying return of racial sovereignty with a vengeance, enacted into state
and local laws and often carried out through partnerships between private
actors and local authorities. This is not the end of the story of American law,
to be sure, but it is a brutal reminder that theories of power and community
are constantly clashing, with potent visions of law continually sifted, co-
opted, or repudiated by existing political institutions.
In short, America's Forgotten Constitutions should be read according to
Professor Rana's first instinct: as a frontal assault on the heroic interpretation
of the political tradition as a coherent set of ideas the enforcement of which
20. See id. at 149 51.
21. See Rana, supra note 1, at 1172.
22. See TSAI, supra note 2, at 118 51.
23. Id. at 150 51.
24. Id.
25. JILL FRANK, A DEMOCRACY OF DISTINCTION: ARISTOTLE AND THE WORK OF POLITICS
136 (2005) (quoting ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1295a).
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has led to a widening circle of freedom and justice. Much has happened
since 1787 and there are certainly significant achievements to be marked; yet
it is also the case that illiberal or otherwise unjust practices remain very
much a part of American life, either explicitly protected by the law or
casually ignored by the authorities. A sense of relative progress but a
measure of uncertainty is what I wished to stir in readers, especially since I
choose to end the book with contemporary efforts by Aryans to establish a
whites-only republic in the Pacific Northwest.26 Far from being merely a
white-supremacist fantasy, the maturation of this community's legal ideas
confirms a shift in tactics, one where the ultimate survival of a racially
conscious community increasingly depends on capitalizing on the
dissatisfaction of mainstream citizens and, perhaps ironically, engaging more
directly with constitutional law.
My point, in any event, is not to measure legal progress in absolute
terms but rather to reveal the discrepancies in ideology and lived experience.
For that reason, the constitutional history that we know all too well does not
get the same kind of treatment in the book once less familiar figures take
center stage.
III. A Dialectical Role for Revolutionary Projects?
A second point raised by Professor Rana in his review flows from a
concern about completeness-more precisely, what gets left out of a book
about a handful of failed constitutions.27 Obviously, there are some failed
experiments that did not make the book, and it is possible that recovery of
other projects will complicate our understanding of the legal tradition further.
There is also the matter of the mysterious relationship between
constitutional successes and failures. With the exception of the Native
American population's efforts to create the State of Sequoyah at the turn of
the twentieth century, which aimed to create a text subordinate to the U.S.
Constitution, the remaining episodes in the book are revolutionary in
nature.28 It is also noteworthy that many of the characters in the book find
themselves disagreeing vociferously with other groups pushing for legal
change.
Along this front, Professor Rana offers some thoughts about the
complex relationship between reformist agendas and revolutionary
movements. In particular, he finds unexplored a tacit claim in the book:
26. See TSAI, supra note 2, at 254 91.
27. See Rana, supra note 1, at 1174 75 (arguing that leaving out some "far more complicated
political history raises the worry that Tsai, by depicting American constitutionalism as marked by
competing and distinct constitution-writing projects, inadvertently tends to compartmentalize the
overall tradition").
28. See, e.g., TSAI, supra note 2, at 18 48, 49 82.
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[A] potential implication of Tsai's work is that those reforms to the
mainstream project-reforms that American citizens are most
proud today-may well have been bound to the threat of
fundamental institutional and ideological challenges. Indeed, a
tacit feature of Tsai's historical narrative is that every high tide of
meaningful social change within mainstream constitutionalism
appears to have occurred during a period with a viable and
oftentimes revolutionary radical base.29
Let me venture some rudimentary thoughts about Professor Rana's
insight. To begin, there are at least two sources of irritation for
revolutionaries. The first is the dominant political regime against which
most legal rhetoric is pitched. This makes instrumental sense from the
standpoint of harnessing the people's anger broadly by gathering as many
likely constituencies as possible, as well as directing that discontent so as to
undermine a regime's legitimacy. A second source of irritation can come
from fellow proponents of legal change. Because the project of
constitutionalism ultimately entails a war for control of the public
imagination, even fellow critics of the status quo become competitors over
scarce resources. Thus, to render her project distinctive and worthy of
support, a revolutionary will often characterize a competitor as collaborating
with a corrupt political regime. We saw this with Malcolm X, who accused
Martin Luther King, Jr. of "keeping negroes defenseless" and "making them
forget what whites have done to them,"30 as well as with proponents of a
World Constitution who criticized supporters of the United Nations for
"perpetuat[ing]" the "competing anarchy of sovereign states," which led to
war, human-rights abuses, and nuclear devastation.3
While they are competitors in an important sense, in truth radicals also
need reformers. The success of moderates playing within the system creates
an opportunity for radicals, who can behave parasitically on reformers'
efforts by engaging an already energized electorate. Therefore, a certain
degree of success by reformers reduces the costs of doing business for
revolutionaries, especially since there is likely to be substantial overlap in the
base of each community. The existence of experienced reformers also forces
revolutionaries to hone their theories to render them distinctive and
comprehensive. More worrisome is what happens to the means chosen by
radicals, for the drive for differentiation can lead them to opt for more
aggressive, even violent, methods of initiating legal change when it appears
their message is not getting through.
From the perspective of reformers, revolutionary projects offer
29. Rana, supra note 1, at 1177.
30. TSAI, supra note 2, at 219.
31. See id. at 199.
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invaluable foils. In the book, I push back against the idea that every
revolutionary project is necessarily lawless, violent, or hopeless. The World
Constitution was a truly visionary project, with a pacific approach to
persuasion.32 The socialists known as the Icarians organized themselves into
a law-based socialist community, preferring to model their legal vision for
others rather than resort to the sword.33 Had John Brown not attacked
Harper's Ferry and saw everything spiral out of control,3 4 his plan to
establish a dissident legal community of militants and ex-slaves might have
gotten further along. Nevertheless, the fear that revolutions can descend into
worsening cycles of lawlessness and violence is a powerful one, kept alive in
historical remnants of the French revolutionary experience but also amply
demonstrated by foiled armed plots on American soil. That fear of
revolutionary chaos is easily invoked by reformers, who contend that
immediate legal changes will calm the electorate and minimize the need for
more far-reaching political solutions. A reformer can play "Good Cop" to
the revolutionary's "Bad Cop," and this dynamic might broaden a reform
movement's appeal to include not only citizens who are ideologically
committed to a cause but also those who prefer order, security, and gradual
change. At moments of considerable debate, the dialectic between revolution
and reform can also speed the timetable for legal changes within the system.
Toward the end of his review, Professor Rana raises the issue of
whether "the disappearance of alternative constitutionalism as a real political
force has removed, perhaps counterintuitively, a critical pillar of support for
reformist agendas within the mainstream project."35 I cannot pretend to do
justice to this insight here but believe it is worth additional investigation. As
my concluding chapters suggest, alternative constitutional visions do remain
available but often must be constructed underground and disseminated in
more resourceful ways. The 1787 Constitution's domination of the political
imagination means that there is far less room for highly visible projects of
legal experimentation and that opponents of radical projects are more easily
characterized as hostile to the rule of law. Every so often, events align that
might be exploited by radicals-e.g., the attacks of 9/11, the election of the
first black president-but far more often what we see today is reformers
acting within the system to accommodate those impulses and siphoning the
energy away from more comprehensive changes. Even when significant
legal changes occur within the system, one wonders whether those changes
are actually supported by measurable popular support, such that they will be
lasting ones.
32. See id. at 185 217.
33. See id. at 49 82.
34. See id. at 102-03.




In the end, I hope the book will unsettle reader's beliefs about the
stability of constitutional ideas. As readers move through each episode, I
would like them to continually ask themselves: what holds together our
political tradition? Surely not the substance of the law, for citizen theorists
vary widely in their beliefs about what powers, institutions, and rights should
be contained in a constitution, even as they believe themselves to be laboring
within the American tradition.3 6 The most disturbing discovery of all might
be that the claim to be the authentic heirs of the tradition is made even by
those who advocate illiberal practices or institutions that subvert those
created by the U.S. Constitution. That realization, too, suggests that the core
of constitutional law-if there is one-is smaller and far more contested than
previously thought.
A defender of the Consensus School might retort: there remains broad
agreement over values such as equality and liberty even if citizens disagree
on the application of these principles. But at times there are such divergent
conceptions of equality and liberty (and justice and republicanism, more
broadly) that it seems fair to ask whether they are even within the same
family of ideas. At that point, one wonders if it is true agreement over
substantive legal values that binds Americans, or instead simply an
agreement o talk in a particular way about the nation's problems.
36. It goes without saying that, as an empirical matter, few Americans know the content of the
Constitution or the law in intimate detail, beyond certain broad abstractions.
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